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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational
behavior in a \lemons market." We analyzed two di®erent market designs,
for which perfect rationality implies complete and partial market collapse,
respectively. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from these
predictions of rational choice theory: Even after 20 repetitions, the actual
outcome is closer to e±ciency than expected.
Our bounded rationality approach to explaining these observations
starts with the insight that perfect rationality would require the players
to perform an in¯nite number of iterative reasoning steps. Boundedly
rational players, however, carry out only a limited number of such itera-
tions. We have determined the iteration type of the players independently
from their market behavior. A signi¯cant correlation exists between the
iteration types and the observed price o®ers.
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11 Introduction
In his landmark paper on \lemons markets," George Akerlof identi¯ed asym-
metric information as a source of ine±cient market outcomes and even market
collapse.1 We have run a series of experiments in which the participants had
to trade in a lemons market. The prices o®ered by the uninformed buyers, as
well as the amount of goods traded, were much higher than those predicted by
rational choice theory. Consequently, the empirical extent of the market failure
was smaller than expected.2
One way to explain such behavior requires relaxing the assumption that
players are perfectly rational. Many models of bounded rationality exist.3 For
example, Stahl/Wilson (1995, 128) have de¯ned and tested boundedly rational
archetypes of players who can be distinguished with respect to their \model of
other players and their ability to identify optimal choices given their priors."
They distinguish two ways in which players can deviate from the classical theory
of decision-making under uncertainty: in their priors about other players or in
their capability of choosing best responses given their priors.4
The concept of bounded rationality that we propose as an explanation of the
behavior observed in our experiment follows the second approach. Moreover, it
draws on the theory of iterative reasoning, which is applicable in games in which
iterative dominance is prevalent.5 The equilibrium result in Akerlof's lemons
market requires the players to compute an in¯nite number of iterative steps to
eliminate dominated strategies. A boundedly rational decision-maker, however,
is able to perform only a limited number of iterations.
The idea of iterative reasoning has been tested in numerous experiments.6
1Akerlof (1970).
2A corresponding result was shown by Bazerman/Samuelson (1983) in their \acquire-a-
company problem."
3See Conslik (1996) for an overview.
4An example that belongs to the ¯rst category of bounded rationality approaches is the
experiment of Beard/Beil (1994): If player 1 holds a belief that player 2 is not su±ciently
rational, then the weakly dominated Nash equilibrium of this game is played. The main
¯ndings of this experiment were reproduced by Goeree/Holt (2001). An example of the
second source of Stahl/Wilson's explanations for deviations from rational choice theory is
that \subjects simplify the problem," as explained by Camerer (1997, 185).
5Chapter 5 of Camerer (2003) provides an introduction to iterative dominance; Section 5.6
explains the \levels of reasoning" concept.
6See, e.g., Schotter/Weigelt/Wilson (1994).
2The \centipede game" of Rosenthal (1981) has raised particular interest. In
contrast to the theoretical prediction, McKelvey/Palfrey (1992) have discovered
that players rarely leave the centipede game at early stages. However, the
probability of termination is increasing in the number of nodes played. This
behavior could be explained by a limited ability for iterated reasoning.
Nagel (1995) also draws on stepwise elimination of dominated strategies and
describes a guessing game experiment which has been executed with thousands
of participants worldwide.7 The vast majority of the participants in her exper-
iment do not play the Nash equilibrium strategy. Nagel explains the deviation
from prediction by the assumption that real-world players make only a limited
number of iteration steps, which appears at ¯rst glance to be very similar to
our experiment.
However, Nagel follows the ¯rst rather than the second approach introduced
by Stahl/Wilson (1995). In her theory, the player under scrutiny is implicitly
assumed to be unlimited in his ability to act rationally, i.e., to ¯nd best re-
sponses. She rather assumes that players have false assumptions concerning the
types of their peers. According to Nagel's results, players are either \type" 1,
2, 3, or in¯nity. This terminology re°ects that subjects assume their peers to
perform either 0, 1, or 2 iteration steps and, consequently, try to be exactly
one step ahead. Or, they assume that the others are perfectly rational (i.e.,
they expect others to perform an in¯nite number of iteration steps) and then
choose the Nash equilibrium strategy. Our approach should carefully be dis-
tinguished from Nagel's in that we do not concentrate on the subjects' beliefs
about other players' types. We rather focus on the subjects' capability of re-
peatedly applying the concept of iterative dominance, i.e., on their ability to
¯nd best responses.
There is another important di®erence between our paper and the experiments
of Beard/Beil (1994) and Nagel (1995): In the latter papers, the explanation
for observed behavior (i.e., the beliefs about the others' types) is based on
the observations themselves. Our contrasting research program is depicted in
Figure 1. We have evaluated two distinct data series which were generated
7See Thaler (1997), Nagel et al. (1999), and Selten/Nagel (1998).
3independently from each other. The one variable consists of the observed prices
o®ered by the uninformed buyers in the lemons market, denoted by p. The
source of the other variable is a questionnaire ¯lled out by the buyers after each
round.8 We have used these written statements to categorize the participants
into \iteration types" (denoted by i).9 We have observed that players are either
extremely limited (type-0 or 1) or elaborate (type-2 and greater). Therefore,
we distinguish only these three categories of iteration types.
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Applying the theory of iterative reasoning to our lemons market, we can de-
rive price intervals from which we expect a buyer of type i to choose his price
o®er. In the ¯nal step, we compare the observed prices with the type-consistent
price intervals to answer our research question: Is there a relation between itera-
tion types and observed prices? We have found a signi¯cant negative correlation
between these data series. Thus, the concept of limited iterative reasoning does
not only theoretically explain the observed behavior; this explanation is also
supported by the data.
8Statements given by the buyer subjects after their decision in an experiment run the risk
of retrospectively serving as a rationalization of the actual behavior. In our case, this problem
can safely be neglected for two reasons: Subjects either have the ability to perform more than
one iteration step or they do not, and this cannot be faked. Moreover, the subjects ¯lled out
the questionnaire before they learned of the actual outcome resulting from their decisions.
9In, e.g., KÄ ubler/WeizsÄ acker (2002), the subjects' iteration types were estimated from the
data.
4In Section 2, we introduce two versions of a lemons market. Under the
assumption of perfect rationality the predicted outcomes in the two markets
are complete and partial market collapse, respectively. We then introduce our
notion of iterative reasoning and derive the predicted behavior for di®erent
degrees of bounded rationality.
In Section 3, we describe our experiment. In the one-shot version of both
parameter settings (Sections 3.1 to 3.2), just as predicted by our bounded ratio-
nality approach, the participants completed many more transactions than would
be expected of perfectly rational players. Higher iteration types (revealed by
the written statements) o®er signi¯cantly lower prices.
As described in Section 3.3, participants repeatedly played one of the two
market designs. We observe that the o®ered prices declined with the number
of rounds played, but remained signi¯cantly above the price that was predicted
for perfectly rational players. This can also be explained by limited iterative
reasoning.
Section 4 concludes the article with a discussion of the possible implications
for economic policy, in particular for the regulation of lemons markets.
2 Adverse Selection
2.1 Setup
This section presents two versions of a lemons market model that we have tested
in a series of experiments. In one parameter setting, the market is expected to
collapse completely. In the other setting some trade is predicted to take place.
However, e±ciency would require all units in both markets to be traded.
Consider a market in which an unspeci¯ed good is traded. We assume its
quality to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1] and denote the actual
quality of a speci¯c unit as Q. Two groups of agents are active in this market:
² Sellers, each of whom owns one unit of the good and knows its true quality.
The sellers' valuation is denoted as a(Q), with a(Q) = ¯Q (¯ > 0).
² Buyers, who cannot observe the true quality of a certain unit of the good,
5but know the distribution of quality. Their valuation is denoted as n(Q) =
° + ±Q.
We assume ° ¸ 0 and ± ¸ ¯: the buyers' valuation for each quality level
Q > 0 exceeds the sellers'.10 We also assume the following interaction structure:
Each buyer makes a price o®er. The o®er is randomly assigned to a speci¯c
seller, who then decides whether to accept the o®er or not. If the seller accepts,
then the unit is traded. If the seller refuses the o®er, then no transaction takes
place. Let the possible reactions of the seller be represented by ¿ = 0 if he
refuses the o®er, and by ¿ = 1 if he accepts.
Denote the initial monetary endowment of the players as Vi ¸ 0 with i = b;s
for buyers and sellers. If a seller receives a certain price o®er p, then his payo® is
Vs+(1¡¿)¯Q+¿p = Vs+¯Q+¿(p¡¯Q). The latter part of this expression is the
seller's expected gain from trade, which we denote as ¦s = ¿(p ¡ ¯Q), whereas
¯Q represents the seller's valuation of this initial endowment with quality.
It is rational for a seller to accept a price o®er if it exceeds his valuation of
the good, that is, if, and only if, ¦s > 0 or, equivalently, p > ¯Q. The simplicity
of the sellers' decisions later allows us to focus on the buyers' reasoning process
only, and the buyers' priors about the sellers' perfect rationality can be taken
for granted.
Having submitted a price p, the buyer's payo® amounts to Vb + ¦b =
Vb + ¿(° + ±Q ¡ p), where ¦b represents the buyer's expected gain from trade.
An uninformed buyer faces a much more complicated decision problem than a
seller. When perfectly rational, he tries to maximize the expected gain from
successfully closing a transaction by choosing an appropriate price o®er p, but
he is unaware of the true quality.
10Under symmetric information, the e±cient outcome could easily be achieved. For each
quality level, there is a buyer whose willingness to pay exceeds the respective seller's willingness
to accept, and the market will be cleared. If both market sides are uninformed, but do know
the distribution of quality, then each buyer and seller would agree to trade a speci¯c unit for
a price between their valuations of the average quality.
62.2 Perfect Rationality
Any price o®er p · ¯ divides the interval of possible qualities into three sub-
sets:11
² Q < n¡1(p): the o®er is accepted (¿ = 1), but the buyer su®ers a loss;
² n¡1(p) < Q < a¡1(p): the o®er is accepted (¿ = 1) with a pro¯t for the
buyer;
² Q > a¡1(p): the o®er is rejected (¿ = 0).
The assumption a(Q) = ¯Q implies a¡1(p) = p=¯. The buyer's expected
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A perfectly rational buyer chooses his price o®er to maximize E¦b(p). We
distinguish two di®erent parameter settings regarding n(Q) = ° + ±Q:
1. ° = 0 and ± > ¯.
2. ° > 0 and ± = ¯.
In case 1, the valuations of both the sellers and the buyers start at the
origin, and the buyers' valuation has greater slope. Case 2 is characterized
by parallel valuation lines. The following proposition derives the optimal price
o®er, denoted by p¤, made by a perfectly rational decision maker.12
Proposition: Assume a market in which the buyers' valuation of
quality Q is n(Q) = ° + ±(Q), and the sellers' valuation is a(Q) =
¯Q, with ° ¸ 0 and ± ¸ ¯ > 0. If
i) ± < 2¯, then the optimal price o®er under the ¯rst parameter
setting (° = 0 and ± > ¯) is p¤ = 0, and the average traded
quality is 0,
11Price o®ers greater than ¯ are strictly dominated and can, therefore, be neglected: with
p = ¯, the price o®er would attract all possible qualities up to Q = 1. Hence, a higher price
o®er cannot make the buyer better o®.
12The proof of this proposition is con¯ned to the appendix.
7ii) ± < 2¯, then the optimal price o®er under the second parameter
setting (° > 0 and ± = ¯) is p¤ = °, and the average traded
quality equals °=2¯,
iii) ± ¸ 2¯, then the optimal price o®er is p¤ = ¯, and the average
traded quality is 1/2.
An optimal price p¤ = 0 implies that the market collapses completely. Even
though it is e±cient to trade all units in the market, asymmetric information
makes the buyers abstain from positive o®ers, so no units are traded. In the




Now we present a more general model which is based on iterative thinking. It
allows for modelling both boundedly and perfectly rational players. We start
with a buyer who does not analyze the situation at all. He picks his price o®er
randomly. We call this type of behavior \performing zero iteration steps." If
another buyer acknowledges that the quality is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1, he would base his decision on the expected quality of 1/2. Such a buyer
would then o®er a price ranging between the sellers' and his own valuation of the
expected Q = 1=2. This buyer performs the ¯rst step of the iterative reasoning
process. His maximal willingness to pay is n(1=2).
A third buyer may realize in this situation that, even if he o®ers his maximal
willingness to pay, the sellers who own the highest qualities would refuse his
o®er. If the buyer understands this, then the expected quality of the good he will
actually receive, conditional on his price o®er, is smaller than the unconditional
expected quality his price o®er was based on after the ¯rst step of reasoning.
Therefore, this buyer will update his o®er and bid a lower price. A buyer
who stops here has performed two steps of iterative reasoning. In the next
reasoning steps, a buyer would realize that the lower the price o®er, the smaller
the maximum quality the buyer can expect to receive.
8Let us denote the expected quality for a buyer who performs k steps of itera-
tive reasoning as EQk. We assume that such a player represents the distribution
of the quality by this expected value. The buyers' maximum willingness to pay
is denoted as nk = n(EQk).
2.3.2 Complete Market Collapse
In parameter setting 1 (i.e., ° = 0 and ± > ¯), the maximum willingness to pay of
a buyer who performs only one step of iterative reasoning is n1 = n(EQ1) = ±=2.
We limit our focus to cases where ± < 2¯, which implies n1 < ¯. To conclude a
transaction, this buyer should at least bid the sellers' valuation of the expected
quality a1 = a(EQ1) = ¯=2.
At a price o®ered after one step of iterative reasoning, all sellers who o®er
a quality greater than Q1 = a¡1(n1) = ±=2¯ will prefer to keep their item for
themselves. It is due to the assumption ± < 2¯ that, even if the buyer o®ers his
maxiumum willingness to pay, the sellers who own units of high quality can be
expected to reject the o®er, or: Q1 < 1.














































a¡1(n1) = Q1 EQ2
9If a buyer performs a second reasoning step, he anticipates Q1 to be the high-
est possible quality in the market if he o®ers p = n1. Therefore, the expected
quality contingent on the maximal o®er during the ¯rst step of iterative reason-
ing is EQ2 = 0:5Q1. Therefore, such a buyer has a maximum willingness to pay,
contingent on his beliefs, which amounts to n2 = n(EQ2) = ±Q1=2 = ±2=4¯:
The assumption ± < 2¯ implies EQ2 < EQ1 and n2 < n1.
Figure 2 displays EQ1, a1, n1, Q1, and EQ2. Quality is shown on the
horizontal axis, the valuations of both sellers and buyers on the vertical axis.
The upper diagonal line represents the buyers' valuation, n(Q), and the lower
one represents the sellers' valuation, a(Q). Clearly, Qk as well as nk decrease
as the number of iteration steps k increases; k 2 I N. Iterative reasoning leads
to lower price o®ers, the greater the number of reasoning steps carried out.
For an in¯nite number of steps, the buyer reaches the price o®er predicted for
perfectly rational buyers: he o®ers zero, and no unit is traded. Boundedly
rational players, however, make only a limited number of steps. A positive price
o®er may reveal a buyer's reasoning level. For any number of reasoning steps
k a player performs, we can derive an interval [ak;nk] from which this theory
predicts the player to choose his price o®er.
2.3.3 Partial Market Collapse
For the second parameter setting (° > 0 and ± = ¯), Figure 3 demonstrates
the situation of a decision-maker who performs one step of iterative reasoning.
Such a buyer assumes an expected quality EQ1 = 1=2. Thus, he should o®er a
price between a1 = a(EQ1) = ¯=2 and n1 = n(EQ1) = ° + ¯=2.
If a buyer carries out a second step, he would realize that, even if he bids
n1, the sellers holding a unit of the highest quality would reject his o®er. The
highest possible quality which a buyer actually expects to achieve during the
¯rst step of reasoning is Q1 = a¡1(n1) = (2° +¯)=2¯. Thus, this buyer expects
a quality that equals Q1=2 = (2° +¯)=4¯. After an in¯nite number of iteration
steps, a perfectly rational buyer o®ers p = °, and qualities below 1=3 are traded.




















































The experimental parameter settings with complete and partial market collapse
are labeled as (comp), and (part), respectively. In the (part) market, we chose
± = 3, and ° = 1. Hence, the buyers' valuation was n(Q) = 1 + 3Q. In
the (comp) market, we chose ± = 4 and ° = 0, leading to n(Q) = 4Q. In
both designs, the sellers' valuation was ¯xed as a(Q) = 3Q (thus ¯ = 3). We
conducted four treatments:
² treatment A: ¯rst (part), then (comp);
² treatment B: ¯rst (comp), then (part);
² treatment C: 20 rounds (comp);
² treatment D: 20 rounds (part).
11In treatments A and B, each subject played (part) and (comp) once. We
added treatments C and D in order to examine whether the observations of the
¯rst two treatments had merely been ¯rst-round e®ects. Here, 20 rounds of
(comp) and (part) were played.13 The experiments were conducted with 248
students of Karlsruhe University (Germany) who participated in 18 experimen-
tal sessions (¯ve sessions each for treatments A and B, and four sessions each for
C and D). The group size ranged from 16 to 20 participants per session. Each
of the subjects participated in only one session. Most of the participants were
studying Business Engineering at the undergraduate level. At the time of the
experiment, none of them had enjoyed any formal training in contract theory.
In each session, the group was split in half and randomly assigned to two
di®erent rooms. The participants were not permitted to communicate with each
other. The written instructions were distributed and read aloud. Questions were
asked and answered only in private.
Treatments A and B were not computerized, i.e., paper and pencil were
used. The participants in each of the rooms ¯rst acted as buyers (they submitted
price o®ers to the other room), and then acted as sellers (they received price
o®ers from the other room). We let subjects take over both roles because sellers
only had to make the simple decision of whether or not a certain price o®er
exceeded the valuation of their unit of the good.14 Every buyer wrote a price
o®er on a prepared form. An administrator in each room ¯rst collected all the
price o®ers. Then he endowed the players in his room with one unit of the
good.15 The price o®ers were randomly allocated to the participants in the
other room, and the sellers' decisions were made.
Before the end of each round, the buyers were asked to write down, in their
own words, the line of reasoning that led to the corresponding price o®er. Fi-
nally, the subjects learned their individual outcomes in private. Only those
13The instructions for (part) in treatments A and B are included in Appendix B. The highly
similar instructions for (comp) as well as for the last two treatments are available on request.
14In the ¯rst session of both treatments A and B, the subjects played only one role, either
that of buyer or seller. From the second session on, we changed to the above procedure. In
principle, we even could have let a computer make the sellers' decisions, but we wanted our
subjects to interact with real people.
15This guaranteed that the quality of participants' units (as sellers) did not a®ect their price
o®ers (as buyers).
12buyers whose o®ers were accepted learned about the quality their partner was
endowed with. Then, the second round was carried out in the same way as the
¯rst, but with a di®erent market design.
While acting as buyers, participants received an initial endowment of 4 Euros
per round, which ensured that their willingness to pay did not exceed their
ability to pay. As sellers, the subjects received an additional show-up fee of
3 Euros which compensated for the possibility of being endowed with a poor-
quality good. After the two rounds, the subjects were paid their earnings in
cash. The chosen parameters resulted in an average payment of about 8 Euros,
and the experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes.
Treatments C and D were computerized. Each subject played 20 rep-
etitions of only one of the above market designs, i.e., (comp) or (part). The
subjects were seated and instructed the same way as under treatments A and
B.16 The buyers were endowed with 4 ECU (experimental currency units) per
round. The sellers received one unit of the good (the quality of which could
be di®erent in each round), and 2 ECU per round to compensate for the pos-
sibility of receiving low qualities of the good. In every round, each buyer was
randomly and anonymously matched anew with one of the sellers. After each
round, the buyers were asked to write down their reasoning regarding the prices
they o®ered in a questionnaire. Then the subjects were informed about their
own outcome from the preceding round. After 20 rounds, subjects were paid
their earnings in cash. 10 ECU amounted to 1.25 Euros. The sessions lasted
about one hour, and the participants were paid about 10 Euros on average.
3.2 Predictions and Results in Treatments A and B
3.2.1 Description of Individual Data
Figures 4 and 5 give an overview of all price o®ers made in both rounds of each
design. Treatment A, i.e., (part) in the ¯rst round and (comp) in the second,
16The procedures di®ered only slightly from treatments A and B in that the subjects stayed
in the randomly assigned role of either buyer or seller during all 20 rounds. Even though
the sellers' situation was of the same simplicity as under treatments A and B, it appeared
reasonable not to switch roles. This experiment was computerized, and we wanted to avoid the
possibility of subjects mixing up the two roles if confronted with di®erent computer screens
in rapid sequence.
13contains 50 observations. Treatment B (¯rst (comp), then (part)) consists of 51
observations per round. The bold symbols represent rejected o®ers (no trade),
and the open ones represent accepted prices (trade). The dots depict the ¯rst
round of play, i.e., (part1) in ¯gure 4, and (comp1) in Figure 5, and the triangles
represent the second round of play, i.e., (part2) and (comp2). The line represents
the sellers' valuation of their quality. For all decisions to be rational, no bold
symbol should appear above the line as the o®ered price exceeded the seller's
valuation. Moreover, no open symbol should appear beneath the line since the



















Figure 4: Price O®ers in (part)
3.2.2 Does the Ordering of the Designs Matter?
The ¯rst step in evaluating the experimental data relates to the question of
whether the ordering of the two market designs in treatments A and B has a


















Figure 5: Price O®ers in (comp)
Ha: The prices in ¯rst-round play of the (comp) market design do not di®er
from those in second-round play.
Hb: The prices in ¯rst-round play of the (part) market design do not di®er
from those in second-round play.
A Wilcoxon test17 shows for each market design that the prices o®ered in
the ¯rst round did not di®er signi¯cantly from the observed prices in the second
round.18 Thus, neither of the null hypotheses can be rejected.
Result 1: The observed price o®ers are independent of the order in which
the market designs were played.
17We have used SysStat version 8.0, a statistical software package from SPSS Inc., to eval-
uate the data. All statistical tests were conducted at a 5 percent signi¯cance level.
18We compared two samples each, i.e. rounds 1 and 2 of each market design by using a
Wilcoxon test controlled for ties. The pairwise comparison of (part1), and (part2) reveals
that in 20 cases the second round price is larger than the corresponding ¯rst round price. In
26 cases, the reverse is true. The Z for our test is -1.640 with a (two-sided) probability 0.101.
In the (comp) markets, the second round price is larger than the ¯rst round price in 19 cases,
and vice versa in 23 cases. The Z is 0.050 with a (two-sided) probability of 0.95.
15This result encouraged us to evaluate the data generated for each market
design without regard to whether it was generated in the ¯rst or the second
round.19
3.2.3 Do Buyers O®er Rational Prices?
The proposition in Section 2.2 and the theoretical analysis in 2.3 show that fully
rational buyers in each of the two market designs need to perform an in¯nite
number of iterative reasoning steps. Many recent experimental studies, however,
reveal that iterative reasoning seems to stop after very few steps, if it starts at
all. Thus, we conjecture a considerable number of subjects to be boundedly
rational when formulating the following null hypotheses:
Hc: In the (comp) market, only p = 0 is o®ered.
Hd: In the (part) market, only p = 1 is o®ered.
If the above null hypotheses are true, the average traded quality in (comp)
should be zero, whereas in the (part) market it is expected to be 1=6 (see the
Proposition in Section 2.2). The descriptive aggregate data of both (comp) and
(part) are provided in Table 1.20 It shows the minimum, maximum, and average
values of the price o®ers, qualities, and traded qualities, as well as the buyers'
and sellers' gains from trade in each market design.21
In (part), 60% of the price o®ers are accepted, and the average price of 1.66
is signi¯cantly greater than the predicted p = 1.22 The average traded quality
of 0.34 is nearly twice as high as the theoretical prediction of 0.17.
In (comp), 46% of all prices o®ered are accepted. The average price o®er
amounts to 1.31 Euros, and the average traded quality is 0.29, both of which are
obviously far greater than zero. Clearly, the market does not collapse completely
under the (comp) design, and we reject both hypotheses.
19We have also evaluated the data of the two rounds separately, which leads to conclusions
that are identical to those subsequently derived.
20As mentioned above, the subjects acted either as buyers or sellers in the ¯rst session.
Therefore, the number of observations is not exactly the half of the number of participants.
21The table only shows the gains and losses from trade (the sellers' show-up fee, their
endowments with the good, and the buyers' monetary endowment are excluded).
22The two-sided one-sample t-test shows that the empirical average is signi¯cantly greater
than the theoretical average of 1 in the null hypothesis Hd. The test results are as follows:
average = 1.664, t = 12.351, and p = 0.000.
16Table 1: Basic Data per Round (in Euros, endowments excluded)
p Q traded Q (¦b) (¦s)
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.20 -1.16
(part) average 1.66 0.51 0.34 0.12 0.47
101 observations max 3.00 1.00 0.94 2.16 2.20
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.71 -1.26
(comp) average 1.31 0.51 0.29 -0.21 0.34
101 observations max 3.40 1.00 0.94 2.18 2.08
Result 2: In both market designs, observed prices are higher than is pre-
dicted for perfectly rational players.
Since some goods are traded, buyers in the (part) design earn an average
payo® of 0.12 Euros but make an average loss of 0.21 in the (comp) market.
Sellers in (part) earn 0.47, whereas in (comp) they only earn 0.34 Euros per
round on average.
3.2.4 Are Higher Prices Explicable by Limited Iterative Reasoning?
In this section we examine the data with regard to our claim that iterative
thinking may provide an explanation for the observation that prices and traded
qualities are higher than predicted by rational choice theory. The argument
proceeds in four steps:
1. We have determined the participants' iteration types independently from
their submitted price o®ers. After each round, the subjects gave descrip-
tions of their own reasoning. We denote the number of iterative reasoning
steps the subject apparently has carried out as \i" and call the subject
\type-i."
2. According to the theory of iterative reasoning and the valuations ai;ni
presented in Section 2.3, we derived the predicted price interval for each
type-i.
3. We then observed the actual price o®er p.
174. Finally, we were interested to see whether an actual price o®er of a par-
ticipant of type-i was drawn from the corresponding interval. This would
establish a relation between the observed behavior and the type-i derived
from the questionnaires.
We have sorted the self-descriptions into three type-i categories.23 If a self-
description contained an expectation of some quality out of the interval [0, 1]
without further evaluation of the market situation, we categorized this subject
into type-0. Participants who expressly mentioned they were calculating with an
expected quality of 1/2 were encoded as type-1. All individuals who performed
more iterative reasoning steps were grouped into the last category, called type-
2+, because the subjects' self-descriptions were not elaborate enough to clearly
distinguish, e.g., type-5 from type-6. Most of the written statements indicate
that players either perform 0, 1, 2, or an in¯nite number of iteration steps.24
Table 2: Types-i and Type-i-consistent Price O®er Intervals
buyer's type-i min o®er max o®er
0 0.00 4.00
comp 1 1.50 2.00
2+ 0.00 1.49
0 0.00 4.00
part 1 1.50 2.50
2+ 0.00 1.49
Table 2 displays the price intervals which a speci¯c type would consistently
choose his price o®er from. We have encountered three problems:
² A subject of type-0 is expected to o®er prices from 0 to 4 in both market
designs. Hence, this type cannot be distinguished from the others.
² According to our theoretical analysis in Section 2.3 regarding the (comp)
23In Appendix C, we present some typical verbal statements of each type. The encoding of
the verbal statements was done without any knowledge of the o®ered prices.
24Thus, our observations are in accordance with studies such as Nagel (1995), or
KÄ ubler/WeizsÄ acker (2002). However, these studies inferred from the observed prices that
the majority of subjects show a tendency to perform only a low number of iteration steps.
The di®erence from our work is that we are able to determine each subject's level of reasoning
independently from the observed price o®er.
18market design, prices from 1.33 to 1.5 (which occurred only twice) cannot
be related to a speci¯c type-i. We have assigned prices below 1.5 to the
interval for type-2+.
² The predicted price intervals in (part) overlap. Prices between 1.5 and
2.25 are in line with type-1 and type-2. Nevertheless, any price below 1.5
is consistent only with type-2+. We decided to locate the price interval
which is consistent with type-2+ at prices between 0 and 1.5, while prices
between 1.5 and 2.25 were assigned to type-1.25
The null hypotheses we tested are:
He: For i = 1;2+, the observed price o®ers in (comp) are equally distributed
over the two corresponding price o®er intervals.
Hf: For i = 1;2+, the observed price o®ers in (part) are equally distributed
over the two corresponding price o®er intervals.
If these null hypotheses are rejected, the observations provide empirical evi-
dence that our theory of iterative thinking may serve as an explanation for the
observed deviations from perfect rationality. Tables 3 and 4 show the frequen-
cies of chosen prices. The ¯rst column lists the price o®er intervals as presented
above in Table 2.
Table 3: (comp) by Type-i. 101 possible observations, 4 descriptions missing
type-
price o®er interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2 5 0 0 5
1:5 · p · 2 30 22 1 53
p < 1:5 22 7 10 39
Sum 57 29 11 97
59% of the subjects in the (comp) and 64% in the (part) market design have
described themselves as type-0. Thereof, the majority have chosen the second
25Hence, the (part) design is less useful than the (comp) design for identifying signi¯cant
correlations between types and their price o®ers.
19Table 4: (part) by Type-i: 101 observations, 4 descriptions missing
type-
price o®er interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2:5 4 3 0 7
1:5 · p · 2:5 38 21 4 63
p < 1:5 20 1 6 27
Sum 62 25 10 97
price interval. Extremely high prices, i.e., prices located in the ¯rst interval,
have solely been chosen by types-0 in the (comp) market, and by types-0 and 1
in (part). Apparently, the likelihood of a low-price o®er increases with higher
type-i. In (comp), as well as in (part), types-2+ chose signi¯cantly lower prices
than types 1.26 Thus, we can reject the null hypotheses and draw the following
conclusion:
Result 3: The iteration types 1 and 2+ derived from the subjects' self-
descriptions are negatively correlated with the observed price o®ers.
This result implies that the iteration types derived from the participants'
self-descriptions may contribute an explanation for the observed behavior.
3.2.5 Is Limited Iterative Reasoning E±ciency-enhancing?
In the previous sections, we derived the conclusion that bounded rationality
on the buyers' side prevents one-shot lemons markets from a complete or par-
tial collapse. Figure 6 shows which market side pro¯ted or lost from trade in
treatments A and B.
The point labeled \i)" represents the situation without trade as well as the
outcome which rational choice theory predicts for the (comp) market. Point
ii) represents the observed outcome under the (comp) design: the total gains
from trade amount to 34.5 Euros for the sellers, and to -21.2 Euros for the
buyers. Trade has earned the group of sellers a remarkable gain which even
exceeds the loss su®ered by the group of buyers. De¯ning welfare as the sum
26The relevant entries are printed in bold numbers in Tables 3 and 4. We used a Chi-Square
test. Under (comp), the Â2-value is 14.55, and p = 0,0001; under (part), the Â2-value amounts
to 12.371, and p = 0,0004.


















of the parties' outcomes, trade has increased welfare, but only in the Kaldor-
Hicks sense. Voluntary trade does not lead to a Pareto-improvement. Hence,
boundedly rational buyers would prefer prohibition over free trade if this were
the only means to protect them from their losses.
The analysis comes to di®erent results for the (part) design. Again, point
i) represents the outcomes without trade. The theoretical prediction, assuming
perfect rationality, is represented by point iv): if the buyers o®er a price p = 1,
then only units with quality Q < 1=3 are traded. A traded unit generates a
welfare gain of 1. With a uniform distribution of quality and 101 buyers, the
expected welfare gain is 33 2/3. The price p = 1 distributes this welfare gain
evenly among the two market sides, so both sides receive 16 2/3. The actual
outcome, however, is shown at point iii): 47.6 in total for the sellers and a total
of 12.4 Euros for the buyers. Welfare is higher than under perfect rationality,
but { as in the (comp) market { at the buyers' expense. The sellers pro¯t from
the existence of bounded rationality among the buyers, while the boundedly
rational buyers are (on average) worse o® than perfectly rational buyers would
21be. However, in the (comp) market, both sides gain from trade. Voluntary
trade induces a Pareto-improvement, and no justi¯cation for prohibition could
be drawn from this study.27
3.3 Repeated Play in Treatments C and D
In section 3.2.4, we saw that many subjects seem to have performed only a
limited number of iterative reasoning steps. This resulted in signi¯cantly higher
price o®ers than predicted by rational choice theory. It is possible that these
results are due to the fact that only one round per market design was played.
The subjects might have learned to perform more iterative steps when playing
several repetitions of the game. Therefore, we let subjects (who did not take part
in treatments A or B) play 20 rounds of either the (comp) design { subsequently
denoted as treatment C { or the (part) design { treatment D. We conjecture
that:
1. Prices and traded qualities do not decline to the level predicted by rational
choice theory (see Section 3.3.1),
2. The subjects' types may change over time (see Section 3.3.2),
3. A correlation exists between types-i and observed prices over 20 rounds
(see Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Data Description
In the repeated (comp) market, 31% of price o®ers during all 20 rounds are
accepted, while the acceptance rate in treatment D is 53%. As in the one-shot
play, we observe higher acceptance rates in the (part) than the (comp) market.
Table 5 displays the prices and qualities, as well as the gains and losses from
trade to the buyers and the sellers. The data aggregate 20 rounds with 31
observations per round under (comp) and 20 rounds with 32 observations per
round under (part). Prices and payo®s show a tendency to be higher in the
27A similar overview could be provided for treatments C and B, however, without additional
insight.
22Table 5: Basic Data per Round (in ECU, endowments excluded)
p Q traded Q ¦b ¦s
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 -0.56
20 times (comp) average 0.93 0.49 0.23 -0.19 0.57
max 3.30 1.00 0.95 1.33 3.00
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.68 -1.94
20 times (part) average 1.58 0.50 0.29 0.09 0.44
max 3.00 1.00 0.98 2.94 2.68
repeated (part) than in the repeated (comp) market. As in treatments A and
B, some buyers face severe losses, especially in the (comp) design.
Figure 7 displays the development of average prices over 20 rounds. Even
in round 20, both in the (comp) and the (part) design, the markets did not
collapse to the extent predicted by rational choice theory. In the repeated
(comp) market, the average price oscillates around 0.60 during the last seven
rounds, which is far more than the theoretically predicted price of zero. Under
the (part) design, the average price appears to be stable at about 1.5 during the
second half of the experiment. Also, this exceeds the predicted p = 1 even after
many repetitions. Moreover, prices decline both more rapidly and to a larger
extent under the (comp) than under the (part) design. This implies our next
result.
Result 4: Even after 20 rounds of repeated play, prices and traded qualities
do not decline to the level predicted by rational choice theory.
3.3.2 The Development of the Types
The average prices show a tendency to decrease over time under both treat-
ments. In light of our theory of bounded rationality, this should coincide with
an increase in the level of reasoning, the more rounds are played. Figures 8 and
9 reveal the percentage of types-0 to 2+ in the two markets.28
During the whole 20 rounds of (comp) (see Figure 8), a stable percentage
28Note that types are not necessary stable over time. A certain subject's type-i may be ad-
justed upwards or downwards if the participant describes his reasoning accordingly. Moreover,
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Figure 7: Price O®ers in repeated (comp) and (part)
of about 60% to 70% of participants are type-0. Types-1 very quickly almost
vanish from the market and, after round 11, constitute only a small share of 3%.
The percentage of types-2+ varies between 3% and 30%. Figure 9 shows that
only one half of the subjects are of type-0 in the repeated (part) market. The
share of types-2+ is almost of the same size as in the repeated (comp) market.
From round 5 on, the percentage of types-1 amounts to about 25%, which is
much higher than under the (comp) design. Overall, the data allow us to draw
the conclusion:
Result 5: The subjects' types-i change over time.
3.3.3 Correspondence of Types-i and Price O®ers
The percentage of type-2+ grows to about 30% during the last third in both
treatments. This is in line with the stable average prices we observe from period
14 on in Figure 7. But, we need to investigate whether the stable types-i and
the stable average prices at the end of the game interact consistently.
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Figure 8: Percentage of Types in 20 rounds (comp)
with regard to his price o®er and his self-described type-i. The columns display
the relative frequency with which a subject described himself as the respective
type. E.g., an individual of \type-0 ¸ 75%" described himself as type-0 in 15 out
of 20 rounds. The rows cluster the consistency of the self-description as type-i
with the actual price o®er. A subject with \consistency of ¸ 90%" o®ered a
price located in the corresponding type-consistent price o®er interval (see Table
2) in at least 90% of the rounds in which he described himself as type-i. Note
that a subject who \changed" his type during 20 rounds must have consistently
changed price o®ers, too, in order to be \consistent." The entries show numbers
of individuals.
Out of 31 subjects, 21 (68%) describe themselves as types-0 in at least 10
out of 20 periods in (comp), and 16 out of 32 (50%) in (part). In Table 6,
many more highly consistent (¸ 90%) than less consistent (< 90%) entries are
registered (see the ¯rst row of each treatment). We, therefore, conclude from
the descriptive data:
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Figure 9: Percentage of Types in 20 rounds (part)
observed prices.
Surprisingly, a more or less pure type-1 is almost nonexistent in the repeated
(comp) market, whereas in the repeated (part) market this type still occurs.
These results might indicate that the higher pressure in (comp) markets forces
the subjects to think more deeply, which induces some of the early-period types-
1 switch to type-2+. Some of the written statements express that the subjects
indeed faced a hard time during the decision process, and the alternative to
Table 6: Frequency of Type-i with Consistent Price O®ers in 20 Rounds
type-0 type-1 type-2+
consistency ¸ 75% ¸ 50% ¸ 75% ¸ 50% ¸ 75% ¸ 50%
20 (comp) ¸ 90% 18 1 0 0 4 0
< 90% 0 2 1 0 1 4
20 (part) ¸ 90% 14 1 3 1 5 3
< 90% 1 0 4 0 0 0
26deeper reasoning seems to be a switch to type-0 by further taking the game
as a gamble. In a (part) market, in contrast, staying type-1 until the end of
the game is not as risky with respect to potential losses from trade. Thus, the
need for more careful thinking is less pressing in the (part) than in the (comp)
market.
4 Conclusion
We have run an experiment for two di®erent lemons markets: under one design,
labeled (comp), perfectly rational players are predicted to complete no trans-
action at all. Thus, the market is expected to collapse completely. Under the
other design (part), perfectly rational players are expected to trade only some
units of low quality. In both market designs under consideration, the observed
price o®ers of uninformed buyers and the average traded qualities are higher
than these predictions.
Our explanation of this behavior draws on the theory of iterative reasoning.
Players who perform only a limited number of iteration steps are boundedly
rational. We have compared the price o®ers with the respective buyers' iteration
types, which were derived from their written self-descriptions independently of
the price o®ers, and have found a negative correlation. This is empirical support
for the hypothesis that limited iterative reasoning provides an explanation for
the observed behavior of buyers in lemons markets.
Comparing the two market settings, we can cautiously interpret the (comp)
design as a lemons market without warranty, while the (part) design is one in
which the risk of breakdown is partially covered. Full insurance (like a quality-
preserving warranty) implies that the buyer's net income from purchasing a car
is constant, irrespective of its actual quality. The results show that a partial
warranty may lead to higher prices and a higher number of transactions as a way
to alleviate the e®ects of asymmetric information. Note that this impact of the
warranty is not driven by a signaling e®ect, nor does it depend on risk-aversion
on the part of buyers.
According to our design, the potential buyers were able to make a take-it
27or leave-it o®er to their respective sellers. Under complete information, this
would provide the buyers with a chance to capture the complete cooperation
rent. Numerous experiments have demonstrated, however, that ¯rst-movers in
ultimatum games do not exploit their position to the fullest, since they have
to be aware of possible rejections (which, in principle, are irrational). In our
experiment, the buyers were also unable to capture the cooperation rent, but
here this was due to the asymmetry of information.29 Boundedly rational buyers
even faced expected losses that were captured by the sellers. Thus, the second
movers turned out to have an extremely strong position in our experiment, due
to their informational advantage. The chance to make a take-it or leave-it o®er,
which is usually clouded only by fear of rejection, can turn into a disadvantage
if the ¯rst-mover is the uninformed party.
The collapse of markets that su®er from asymmetric information is an inspir-
ing theoretical phenomenon. If, however, bounded rationality (in the form of
limited iterative reasoning) of the uninformed market participants is taken into
account, the ine±ciency in the theoretical result might be greatly exaggerated.
If market failure only occurs in theory, but not in reality, institutional means
(such as mandatory insurance, warranties, building of reputation...) based on
theory might go too far or be too costly, and may perhaps do even more harm
than good.
This policy implication of our results, however, su®ers from a serious draw-
back: successfully completed transactions may in°ict losses upon the buyers.
After the completion of a transaction, the actual quality of the item sold is
revealed. Some buyers may then realize that their valuation of the purchased
item is lower than the price they paid. They submitted their o®er based on false
(i.e., overly optimistic) expectations. In such a case, a concluded transaction is
only a Kaldor-Hicks-improvement, but not a Pareto-improvement. If the buyers
were perfectly rational, they would let the market collapse, avoiding such losses.
Therefore, potential buyers who are boundedly rational might be interested in
29Note that in our ultimatum game, the ¯rst-mover did not demand a share of a given
\cake." He rather demanded a slice from a cake, the size of which was unknown to him. In
the ultimatum game with complete information, this distinction may be irrelevant, but under
asymmetric information this seems to be crucial.
28regulation that protects them from completing harmful transactions in lemons
markets.
Appendix A
Proof of the Proposition
Let us ¯rst derive the condition for an optimal price in a general framework.
Recall that sellers value quality Q with a(Q) = ¯Q, while the buyers value
quality with n(Q) = ° + ±Q. We assume ° ¸ 0 and ± ¸ ¯ > 0. We can
disregard price o®ers p > ¯ since they are strictly dominated by p = ¯. For any
price o®er p 2 [0;¯], the respective buyer's expected payo® is
















































If ± ¸ 2¯, then the corner solution p = ¯ maximizes the buyer's payo®, which
proves our third result.
If, on the other hand, ± < 2¯, then an internal maximum exist, as the second-





Thus, in our parameter setting 1 (° = 0 and ¯ < ± < 2¯) the maximum payo®
is obtained with p = 0. This result establishes our prediction according to which
the market collapses completely under this parameter setting.
In our second parameter setting (° > 0 and ¯ = ±), the second-order condition








29This establishes our second result, according to which the market collapses only
partially.
Appendix B
The Basic Instructions (Treatment A)
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Each participant makes his
decisions in isolation from the others and enters them into an answer sheet.
Communication between participants is not allowed. Male forms like "he" will
be used to refer to anyone.
In the experiment, there are two types of players, \buyers" and \sellers," in the
market for good X. You take both the role of a \buyer" and the role of a
\seller." The subjects you interact with are not located in your room but in
the room opposite to yours. There are as many subjects in your room as in the
opposite one.
The experiment consists of 2 rounds. In each of the two rounds, one seller
interacts with one buyer. In both rounds, buyers and sellers will be matched
randomly anew. Thereby, a subject from this room in the role of a seller ran-
domly interacts with a buyer from the opposite room. Likewise, a subject from
the opposite room randomly interacts as seller with a buyer from this room.
Therefore, in the role of a seller, you always sell your X to the other room.
There is only a small chance that you as a buyer interact with a seller from the
other room who simultaneously acts as buyer of your X. In each of the two
rounds, it will be randomly allotted which buyer and seller interact. Even after
the experiment, you will not be informed about who you traded with.
In each round, each seller is endowed with one unit of good X, and each buyer
has 4 Euros at his disposal.
In each of the two rounds, the situation is as follows: The sellers o®er their X.
Each unit of good X has a certain quality that is only known to its seller. The
qualities of X are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], that is each quality
between 0 and 1 is equally probable. Thus, 0 indicates the worst and 1 the best
quality. This probability distribution is known to both buyers and sellers. The
actual quality of a unit of good X is labeled Q.
The buyers value good quality more highly than bad quality. The valuation of
a certain quality in Euros is described by a function n(Q). The exact shape of
the function n(Q) will be explained later in the instructions. No buyer
can discover the real quality prior to his decision to buy; he only knows the
probability distribution of quality. Not until after a purchase does each
buyer learn about the real Q of his unit of X.
After each round, the buyers are credited a payo® following this rule:
² If trade has taken place at price p, the buyer gets 4 ¡ p + n(Q) Euros,
² If no trade has taken place, the buyer gets 4 Euros.
As for the sellers, the function a(Q) = 3Q denotes their value of good X in
Euros: If X is not sold in one round, the seller receives a(Q) Euros in that
round. If, in contrast, a seller sells his X, he obtains the respective sales price.
The totalled payo®s of the two rounds are the earnings of buyers and sellers.
Each round passes as follows:
301. First, the buyer makes his decision and enters his proposal for a sales price
on his form (there are separate forms for each of the two rounds). All
forms will then be collected by the experiment supervisor and randomly
distributed to the sellers in the other room. Each seller gets exactly one
form.
2. Each seller gets assigned a certain quality. Then he decides whether or
not he wants to sell his unit X at the price proposed by the buyer. He
enters this decision in the form. If a sale is made, he also enters the actual
quality of the unit sold.
3. Again, the forms will be collected by the experiment supervisor and given
back to the respective buyers. If a purchase has taken place, the buyer is
informed about the real quality of the good X that he bought.
4. This completes one round.
5. After the two rounds, each player gets paid his total payo®s in cash.
Instructions Buyers, 1. round30
Your subject number is:
During this round, the situation on the X-market is as follows (also see Figure
10:
² Each buyer owns exactly 4 Euros, and each seller owns exactly one unit
of X.
² The buyer's valuation of the quality of good X in the ¯rst round is n(Q) =
1 + 3Q. Thus, for example, one unit of good X with quality Q = 0.7 is
worth n(0:7) = 3:1 Euros to each buyer.
² The sellers value X by a(Q) = 3Q. Therefore, the same unit is worth
a(0:7) = 2:1 Euros to the seller.
Example:
We assume a buyer to purchase an X at price p = 2:4 Euros, and the real quality
of that X to be Q = 0:3. Thus, p > n(Q). Then, the buyer receives an amount
of (4 ¡ 2:4 + 1:9) = 3:5 Euros out of this round. If, in contrast, he buys this
unit (with Q = 0:3) at price p = 1:1 Euros, then p < n(Q). His earnings will
then be (4 - 1.1 + 1.9) Euros = 4.8 Euros.
O®er Form (Round 1)31
The decision of a buyer
Your subject number is:
30The instructions for the second round are the same, except for the altered n(Q) which
then is n(Q) = 4Q.










I want to buy one unit of X at price p = ....
..............................................................................
The decision of a seller
Your subject number is (please ¯ll in!): ...
My decision :
( ) I decline the o®er.
( ) I accept. My unit of X is of quality Q = ....
The Questionnaire
Description of sellers' reasoning:
Your subject number is:
Please brie°y describe the reasoning that led to your particular sales price pro-




Here, we present some typical verbal statements of our participants.
Type-0 is supposed to not even calculate an expected quality. Some of the
written statements that we coded as types-0 are, for example:
² \I chose p such that quality gets better,"
² \I had no idea, I just gambled,"
32² \Seller only sells if p > 3Q; my choice was arbitrary { best choice would
have been 1 Cent above 3Q,"
² \Defensive behavior - better to be left with the good on my hands,"
² \I analyzed what the seller's quality must be, compared to my price o®er,"
² \Pro¯ts rise with higher risk { no alternative seems to have decisive ad-
vantages, so I chose the middle course."
Type-1 is expected to explicitly use an expected quality of 1/2 in their calcula-
tions. Some examples are:
² \E(Q) = 1=2 and a(Q) = 1:5; thus, my o®er is 1.51,"
² \Since Q is uniformly distributed, I used Q < 1=2 (risk-averse). Because
a(Q) = 3Q, I chose p = 1:5,"
² \With E(Q) = 0:5 a price p = 1:5 is accepted with probability 1/2,"
² \I calculated E(Q) = 0:5 and wanted to make some pro¯ts."
Finally, type-2+ performs at least one more step of iterative reasoning than
type-1. Therefore, type-2+ knows that the conditional expected quality clearly
is smaller than 1/2 and a loss is to be expected with too high a price. Some
examples (from the (part) market) are:
² \I compared possible gains and losses in a table; the chance to gain is 1:3
compared to the chance to lose; this is too risky,"
² \The possible loss is always higher than the possible gain; thus, on average
there is always a loss,"
² \The expected gains are always smaller than 0; an o®er is advantageous
only if the slope of n(Q) is at least twice as much as the slope of a(Q),"
² \E.g., at p = 1:6 the seller sells if Q < 0:5: with Q = 0:5 pro¯ts are 40
cents, with Q = 0:4 pro¯ts are zero, with Q = 0:3 losses are 40 cents, and
so on; thus, there is a negative expected pro¯t."
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